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NOTE
CORPORATE REHABILITATION UNDER
CURRENT AND PROPOSED BANKRUPTCY
LAW
I.

INTRODUCTION

"Business failures, including the corporate bankruptcy phenomenon, are sobering economic realities reflecting the uniqueness
of the American way of corporate death."' Implicit in a capitalistic society is the harsh fact that some enterprises will fail to
survive the competitive scramble for the market. Rarely, however, will business failures be attributable to a single cause; to the
contrary, most result from the interplay of numerous complex
factors.2 Many analysts denominate these factors as the immediate causes (those most proximately precipitating the financial
crisis) or the underlying causes (those creating the firm's vulnerability to the immediate cause). One author has classified the
causes as endogenous (internal to the firm), and exogenous (external to the firm).' The present adverse business climate, with
its accompanying tight credit conditions, constitutes an exogenous or underlying cause. Thus, the increased number of filings in
the Bankruptcy Division of the Federal District Courts can be
seen as a consequence of the current recession. This conclusion
is supported by studies which indicate a clear correlation between
recessive periods and business failures.' In light of this fact, and
1. E. ALTMAN, CORPORATE BANKRUPTCY IN AMERICA 1 (1973).
2. See generally Fredland, The Business Bankrupts, in REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON
THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, PART 1Im(1973) [hereinafter cited as Fredland].
3. Id. at 11. See also D. STANLEY AND M. GIRTH, BANKRUPTCY: PROBLEM, PROCESS,
REFORM 111 (1971) [hereinafter cited as BROOKINGS REPORT]. The BROOKINGS REPORT is a
result of a study undertaken by the Brookings Institution, an independent organization
devoted to nonpartisan research, education, and publication in economics, government,
foreign policy, and the social sciences generally. It was stated in the forward that the study
was initiated at the request of representatives of the federal judiciary because of the lack
of major studies in the areas of bankruptcy administration and policy during the last two
or three decades.
4. Fredland, supra note 2, at 12.
5. Id. at 13. See also E. ALTMAN, CORPORATE BANKRUPTCY IN AMERICA 46-49 (1971) for
discussion and tables of the relationship of business failures to various economic indicators.
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because of today's increasingly unstable economic conditions, the
subject of business bankruptcies assumes particular importance.
Numerically, business collapses currently constitute only about
8 percent of total bankruptcy (down from approximately 25 percent in 1950), but the average liability of business failures has
increased dramatically in recent years.' "Although relatively few
firms fail, these most extreme cases of business difficulty do impose social costs which make them a legitimate object of public
concern." '
A financially distressed business debtor may seek, or be compelled to seek, relief under Chapters I-VII of the Bankruptcy Act
(straight bankruptcy),8 which provide essentially for a liquidation
of assets, distribution to creditors, and complete discharge of
debt.' In the event that financial rehabilitation appears to be
more desirable, a business beset by financial crisis may invoke
the Chapter X reorganization provisions or Chapter XI arrangement provisions of the Bankruptcy Act." Both chapters are designed to allow a financially troubled business to continue operations on the theory that creditors and other interested parties will
benefit if the business can be salvaged and preserved as a going
6. Fredland, supra note 2, at 3, citing DUN & BRADSTRaEET, INC., THE FAILURE RECORD
THROUGH 1971 at 2.

7. Id.
8.The current Bankruptcy Act basically consists of the original Act of 1898 as extensively amended by the 1938 Chandler Act. The Bankruptcy Act is embodied in Title 11
of the 1970 edition of the United States Code. Straight bankruptcy is covered in Chapter

V of the proposed Act.
9. The overwhelming number of business bankruptcies are straight liquidation proceedings under Chapters I-VII. Indicative of this is the fact that of the total number of
189,513 bankruptcy proceedings (business and nonbusiness) commenced in the United

States during the fiscal year ending on June 30, 1974, 157,967 were straight bankruptcies.
There were only 163 Chapter X proceedings initiated and 2,171 Chapter XI filings. "Ta-

bles of Bankruptcy Statistics," Table F 2, for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1974, published by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts.
10. A Chapter XI proceeding is strictly voluntary on the part of the debtor while

Chapter X may be invoked by creditors. See notes 34-35 and accompanying text infra.
Although the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 did not provide for rehabilitation, the Chandler Act
of 1938 added Chapters X and XI which did permit rehalilitation. Chapter X is codified
in 11 U.S.C. §§ 501-676 (1970). Chapter XI is codified in 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-99 (1970).

Although Chapter VII of the proposed Act is a consolidation of present Chapters X, XI,
and XII, only Chapters X and XI, which deal with corporate bankruptcies, will be discussed in this note. Chapter XII, which deals only with individuals owning real property,
will not be discussed because of its minimal use and importance. See REPORT OF THE
COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPrCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, PART I, H.R. Doc. No. 93-

137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 240-41 (1973) [hereinafter cited as I CoMriSSION REPORT and Part
II will be cited as II COMISSION REPORT], and J. MAcLACHLAN, BANKRUPTCY 372-73 (1956)
for comment on the slight use of Chapter XII.
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concern. However, the procedures employed under these two
chapters are, at least theoretically, vastly different."
The focus here is primarily on the problem of the corporate
debtor' 2 and the viability and desirability of the Chapters X and
XI rehabilitative procedures which may or may not provide a
solution to the debtor's financial problem. In Part II, the theoretical distinctions between the two chapters will be examined, as
well as the difficulties encountered when attempting to devise a
proper remedy for the financial ills of a particular debtor. This
choice of remedy issue will be further developed in light of the
problem of determining whether Chapter X or XI is applicable
to a given factual situation. As will be seen, the Securities and
Exchange Commission sometimes plays a significant role in this
choice. In Part III, some practical problems of the present corporate rehabilitation system will be considered, followed by a critical analysis of the solutions to these problems suggested by Chapter VII of the proposed Bankruptcy Act."3
11. The initial conceptual disparity between the two chapters is illustrated by the
fact that the Securities and Exchange Commission was instrumental in obtaining congressional approval of Chapter X, while the National Association of Credit Men was the
primary impetus behind the passage of Chapter XI. Chapter X was enacted to provide
protection for the investing public while affording relief to large publicly held corporations. On the other hand, Chapter XI was intended merely to establish a quick, simple,
and practical method for small and middle-sized businesses to obtain economic relief. See
Rostow & Cutler, Competing Systems of CorporateReorganization: Chapters X and XI
of the Bankruptcy Act, 48 YALE L.J. 1334 (1939). In this article, which was published soon
after the enactment of Chapters X and XI, the following observation was made which
emphasizes the breadth of the originally perceived difference between the two chapters:
Chapter X is reorganization in the grand manner. It represents the response of
its draftsmen to the great reorganization cases and to the atmosphere of melodrama and importance which colors all discussion of them .

. .

. Chapter XI,

on the other hand, has about it the grubbiness of bankruptcy. It provides a
cheap and practical method of settlement . . . for poor debtors whose estates
cannot afford the expense of an elaborate public ceremonial.
Id. at 1334.
12. The provisions of Chapter XI are equally applicable to an individual or to a
partnership. Although Chapter X is available only to "corporations," section 1(8) of the
Bankruptcy Act (11 U.S.C. § 1(8)) defines this to include, for purposes of the Act, certain
unincorporated concerns and associations and businesses conducted by trustees.
13. The Bankruptcy Commission was established in 1970 by Public Law 91-354 (84
Stat. 468). In 1973 the Commission submitted a report consisting of two parts. Part I
contains an analysis of present Bankruptcy law with recommendations for certain changes
therein, and Part II contains the text of the proposed Bankruptcy Act of 1973. Also
submitted was an appendix (Part I) which contains certain studies which were conducted by or on behalf of the Commission. See I CommissioN REPORT, supra note 10, Letter
of Transmittal. The proposed Act was introduced in the House on October 9, 1973, H.R.
10972, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
The authors of this note are aware that they have undertaken the consideration of a
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II.

A.

A

REVIEW OF CHAPTERS X AND

XI

Introduction
"The underlying thesis of reorganization law is that the going

concern value of the debtor's assets is greater than their forced
liquidation value."" Straight bankruptcy (liquidation)' 5 should

be employed only when there appears to be so little hope of successfully injecting new life into a corporation that further expenditures of time and money are unjustified." A business that is
allowed to continue in existence and to maintain its goodwill may
reestablish itself as a healthy operation worth substantially more
than just the mere value of its assets. In fact, one of the statutory
prerequisites of confirmation of a Chapter X reorganization plan
is a showing of "feasibility"" or a "reasonable prospect for survival"' 8 for the immediate future. This feasibility requirement
illustrates one of the limitations on the policies underlying Chapter X; while the statute favors the preservation of a going concern,
it has been noted judicially that the Act is not designed to "place
crutches under corporate cripples, fit subjects for liquidation, and
send them out to be a menace to all who might purchase their
9
securities or deal with them on credit."'
The group which conducted the Brookings study found that
relatively little actual rehabilitation is effectuated through Chapters X and XI, and this finding precipitated a proposal for an
extensive revision of those chapters." It was found that the complexities and delays inherent in a Chapter X proceeding created
staggering amount of material in relatively few pages. It is our hope, however, to at least
bare the most significant areas of concern to the practitioner who may become directly or
indirectly involved in a corporate rehabilitation and who is not intimately acquainted with
Chapters X and XI of the Bankruptcy Act. This goal of covering a rather broad spectrum
at times necessarily resulted in the sacrifice of analytical depth.
14. Coogan, The Proposed Bankruptcy Act of 1973: Questions for the NonBankruptcy Business Lawyer, 29 Bus. LAw. 729, 741 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Coogan,
ProposedAct].
15. The straight bankruptcy provisions of the present Bankruptcy Act are contained
in Chapters I-VII. These provisions of the proposed Act are contained in Chapter V.
16. "Economically, liquidation is justified when the value of the assets sold individu-

ally exceeds the capitalized value of the assets in the marketplace." E.
RATE BANKRUPTCY IN AMERICA 12 (1971).

ALTMAN, CORPO-

17. Bankruptcy Act § 221(2), 11 U.S.C. § 621(2) (1970).
18. Group of Institutional Investors v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R.R., 318 U.S. 523, 540

(1943). See also Consolidated Rock Prods. Co. v. Du Bois, 312 U.S. 510 (1941).
19. Price v. Spokane Silver & Lead Co., 97 F.2d 237, 247 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 305
U.S. 626 (1938).

20.

BROOKINGs REPORT,

supra note 3, at 3.
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significant obstacles to the survival of a corporation. 2' Less than
one-fourth of the Chapter X proceedings concluded during the
fiscal years of 1964 through 1969 resulted in successful reorganizations.2 Of the arrangements attempted under confirmed Chapter
XI plans, only one-third of the businesses were self-operating two
years after the proceedings were terminated.23
Despite these somewhat discouraging statistics, Chapter X
reorganizations and Chapter XI arrangements are nonetheless
still frequently attempted. Peter Coogan has explained this
taunting of the failure rate as follows:
Creditors will often prefer what may become a slow liquidation
under a chapter proceeding to a straight liquidation bankruptcy. Even where the chance of a successful reorganization
seems remote, customers are more likely to pay up accounts,
inventory can be sold in something approaching the ordinary
course of business, the debtor finds a buyer for individual items
of equipment; and perhaps, units of business that the debtor has
been unable to operate successfully can be sold at better than
21. Id. at 145.
22. Id. Statistics are from "Tables of Bankruptcy Statistics," Table F4b, for the
respective years, published by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts. The
Brookings Report figures went through 1968. The 1969 statistics, the most recent ones
available on this point, indicate even fewer successful reorganizations, about one-fifth of
the total Chapter X filings.
23. Id. at 115-17. The following graph, found on page 116, illustrates the results of
Chapter XI arrangements in a sampling of districts:
Table 6-3.

Results of Confirmed Chapter XI Plans Two Years after Proceeding
Closed, by District in Percent

Results
Still in business
Business discontinued
Assets sold to finance
plan
Liquidated after plan
confirmed
Default under plan
Business under new
control
Merged into parent
company
No data

Six
Districts a

No.
Alabama

33
30

-

14

-

17

-

28

8
5

100

17
-

50
-

20
8

5

-

-

50

-

1
6

-

33

-

No.
Ohio Maine
33

-

So.
N.Y.

So.
Calif.

32

39
50

18
-

6

29

6
-

11

-

25

-

-

-

-

-

No.
Ill.

4
8

18

Source: Dun and Bradstreet records, 1967. Percentages may not add to 100 because of
rounding.
a. There were no Chapter XI cases in Oregon or Western Texas.
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liquidation values to someone who is persuaded that he can do
what the debtor could not do. 4
There remains, of course, the statutory mandate that a plan be
feasible, and, under Chapter X, that a plan be filed in good
faith." Remington, in his treatise on bankruptcy law, has stated
with regard to Chapter X, that "petitions to reorganize corporations ripe for liquidation cannot be approved as filed in good
faith, since good faith implies honesty of purpose to preserve
going concern values and to avoid the evils of liquidation."26 This
statement is further qualified by the proviso that if a plan is
initially approved as filed in good faith, the fact that liquidation
ultimately becomes "the more desirable way of winding up the
debtor's estate" is of no importance.? Case law has also established that a straight bankruptcy should not be contemplated
under Chapter X unless the plan fails.? Of course, the future
survival of a Chapter X corporation is generally of particular
concern to interested parties because the plan frequently involves
a readjustment of the capital structure and the issuance of stock
or long term securities in partial or complete satisfaction of
claims. 2 The situation is easily envisioned in which a Chapter X
plan, followed by eventual liquidation, could drastically alter the
status of certain creditors.3 1 Under a Chapter XI plan, which
ordinarily involves merely the extension or composition of claims,
the feasibility problem would not appear quite as significant. In
fact, the authors of the Brookings Report, after discussing the
failure statistics of Chapter XI, concluded that the high failure
24. Coogan, Proposed Act at 741.
25. Bankruptcy Act § 221(3), 11 U.S.C. § 621(3) (1970).
26. 11 H. REMINGTON, BANKRUPrCY § 4465, at 158 (1961) (footnotes omitted)
[hereinafter cited to the appropriate volume as REMINGTON]. An exception to this is said
to exist if the corporate purpose is holding and liquidation.
27. Id.
28. See In re USA Motel Corp., 450 F.2d 499 (9th Cir. 1971); Dubladenhill, Inc. v.
Sharrets, 375 F.2d 558 (4th Cir. 1967). But see In re R.L. Witters Associates, 93 F.2d 746
(5th Cir. 1938) (reversing a dismissal of a petition calling for ultimate liquidation and
holding that a gradual liquidation was permitted under § 77B, the precursor of Chapter
X). According to Remington, this latter decision is unique in its view. 11 REMINGTON §
4465, at n.2.
29. BROOKINGS REPORT, supra note 3, at 145.
30. This could occur, for example, if a secured creditor of a developer, in exchange
for shares of stock, relinquishes a security interest in certain capital assets which are to
be sold so that the proceeds can be funneled into a more promising project to keep the
corporation from collapsing. If the business then fails, that creditor would probably take
a total loss.
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rates did not signify that the plans should not have been attempted. 3 In their opinion, however,
[iut does mean that the referees concern themselves very little
with the future prospects of the business when they approve
payment plans. The statutory requirement that a plan be "feasible" has been interpreted in practice to mean that the creditors seem likely to receive what is being promised them, rather
than that the debtor seems likely to survive. Such an interpretation may produce more money for creditors than they would
but it does not assure rehabilitareceive in straight bankruptcy,
32
tion of the debtor.
In the event that a financially troubled corporation concludes that rehabilitation appears to be more advantageous than
straight bankruptcy, it must determine whether to seek assistance under Chapter X or under Chapter XI. Its decision will be
contingent first upon the needs and preferences of the corporation, and then upon the court's determination that the plan meets
the statutory requirements of the particular chapter elected. Generally, however, Chapter X is deemed appropriate for large publicly held corporations or corporations with complicated debt
structures in situations where the rights of secured creditors must
be affected. Chapter X is also appropriate where a realignment
of the capital structure may be necessary, or when a pervasive
reorganization is required. Chapter XI, on the other hand, is normally considered the proper route in the case of a small corporation which requires only the composition and extension of claims
of unsecured creditors.33 An analysis of various provisions of the
two chapters will show that Chapter X is by far the more
structured and court-controlled approach to corporate resuscitation.
B.

Initiation of Proceedings and Immediate Concerns
1.

The Petition

A corporate debtor may voluntarily seek relief under either
chapter34 or may involuntarily be forced into a Chapter X proceeding if a petition is filed by three or more creditors with claims
aggregating $5,000 or more against the corporation or its prop31.
32.
33.
34.

BROOKINGS REPORT, supra note 3, at 115.

Id.
See Seidman, ChapterX or ChapterXI?, 76 CoM. L.J. 33 (1971).
Bankruptcy Act §§ 126, 321, 11 U.S.C. §§ 526, 721 (1970).
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erty.31 Under either chapter, the debtor voluntarily seeking relief
must allege in its petition that it is either "insolvent or unable to
pay its debts as they mature."36 A Chapter XI petition is only
required to contain that allegation and a proposed plan of arrangement (or statement of intention to submit one).Y In sharp
contrast, the requirements of Chapter X are much more stringent
and numerous." Every petition must state "the specific facts
showing the need for relief under this chapter and why adequate
relief cannot be obtained under chapter XI . . . ."I When a
Chapter XI plan is involved, court approval is not required before
submission for consideration by creditors." However, when a
Chapter X petition is filed, the court must examine it first. Approval requires "(1) a conclusion of law to the effect that the
petition complies with the Act, and (2) a finding of fact that the
petition is filed in good faith."4 1 According to authorities on the
subject, good faith presupposes more than merely good intentions.4" A realistic intent to effect a reorganization is required, as
35. Bankruptcy Act § 126, 11 U.S.C. § 526 (1970).
36. Bankruptcy Act §§ 130(1), 323, 11 U.S.C. §§ 530(1), 723 (1970).
[TIechnical insolvency exists when a firm cannot meet its current obligations
signifying a lack of liquidity. Another term used to depict the same situation is
insolvency in an equity sense...
Insolvency in a bankruptcy sense is a more critical condition and indicates
a chronic rather than temporary illness. A firm finds itself in this situation when
its total liabilities exceed a fair valuation of its total assets.
E. ALTMAN, CORPORATE BANKRUPTCY IN AMERICA 3 (1971) (italics in original).
37. Bankruptcy Act § 323, 11 U.S.C. § 723 (1970).
38. The specific requirements which must be met by a Chapter X petition are set
forth in section 130 of the Bankruptcy Act (11 U.S.C. § 530). Additional requirements of
an involuntary petition are contained in section 131 (11 U.S.C. § 531).
39. Bankruptcy Act § 130(7), 11 U.S.C. § 530(7) (1970).
40. See Bankruptcy Act §§ 331-36, 11 U.S.C. §§ 731-36 (1970).
41. 11 REMINGTON § 4460, at 149. See Bankruptcy Act §§ 141-44, 11 U.S.C. §§ 541-44
(1970). Although the requirement of good faith is not defined, section 146 of the Act (11
U.S.C. § 546) establishes the following circumstances which, although not an exclusive
list, compel a dismissal of the plan as not having been filed in good faith:
(1) the petitioning creditors have acquired their claims for the purpose of filing
the petition; or
(2) adequate relief would be obtainable by a debtor's petition under the
provisions of chapter XI of this Act; or
(3) it is unreasonable to expect that a plan of reorganization can be effected;
or

(4) a prior proceeding is pending in any court and it appears that the interests
of the creditors and stockholders would be best subserved in such prior proceeding.
Bankruptcy Act § 146, 11 U.S.C. § 546 (1970).
42. 11 REMINGTON § 4461, at 153; 2 MODERN BANKRUPTcY MANUAL § 1527 (1966).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol27/iss4/9

8

Beckham and Orr: Corporate Rehabilitation under Current and Proposed Bankruptcy La

1976]

BANKRUPTCY

well as circumstances indicating the existence of a legitimate

possibility of successful rehabilitation."
2.

Immediate Relief

Generally, if a debtor is in a position of such financial instability that it must seek relief under the Bankruptcy Act, the
situation is sufficiently critical that a stay enjoining foreclosures
and other actions is essential to continuing operations.4 Such a
respite is provided under either chapter; in a Chapter X proceeding, the court may stay or enjoin suits immediately upon the
approval of a petition.4 5 Court approval of the petition also operates as an automatic stay of "a prior pending bankruptcy, mortgage foreclosure, or equity receivership proceeding, and of any act
or other proceeding to enforce a lien against the debtor's prop46
erty."
Under Chapter XI the court is also effectively empowered to
stay or enjoin actions against the debtor until issuance of the final
decree. 7 This authority appears to be restricted primarily by the
fact that an arrangement is permitted to affect only the rights of
unsecured creditors. 8 The determination, however, of whether a
secured creditor is affected is within the exclusive province of the
court49 which construes its powers very liberally in an effort to
effectuate corporate rehabilitation. In this respect, it has been
43. See note 42 supra.
44. See generally Coogan, ProposedAct at 745.
45. Bankruptcy Act § 116(4), 11 U.S.C. § 516(4) (1970).
46. Bankruptcy Act § 148, 11 U.S.C. § 548 (1970). This authority to stay or enjoin
actions is in addition to that conferred generally by section 11 of the Act (11 U.S.C. § 29),
which is applicable to all bankruptcy proceedings.
47. Bankruptcy Act § 314, 11 U.S.C. § 714 (1970). A stay or injunction may be
granted under this section only until the final decree is issued. Under section 357(7) of
the Act (11 U.S.C. § 757(7)), however, the court may expressly retain jurisdiction over
the arrangement. In re Gordon, 44 F. Supp. 581 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd per curiam, 131 F.2d
863 (2d Cir. 1942). See also 9 REMINGTON § 3653. Section 357(7) of the Act allows for
possible retention of jurisdiction until the provisions of the arrangement have been performed. It does not delineate the permissible scope of such jurisdiction. Although the case
law would indicate that the scope is limited, continued authority to grant stays of action
does not appear to be excluded. See generally Seedman v. Friedman, 132 F.2d 290 (2d
Cir. 1942); In re Pathe News, Inc., 276 F. Supp. 670 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); 9 REMINGTON § 3653.
48. Bankruptcy Act §§ 307, 356, 11 U.S.C. §§ 707, 756 (1970).
49. Bankruptcy Act § 308, 11 U.S.C. § 708 (1970) provides:
A creditor shall be deemed to be "affected" by an arrangement only if his
interest shall be materially and adversely affected thereby. In the event of
controversy, the court shall after hearing upon notice summarily determine
whether any creditor is so affected.
50. See In re Laufer, 137 F. Supp. 637 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), rev'd on other grounds, 230
F.2d 866by
(2dScholar
Cir. 1956).
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said that the difference between Chapters X and XI "may be
more apparent than real."'" If salvaging a corporation is a hopeful
prospect, a court may be inclined to find that the secured creditors are not "affected" by the arrangement and thus aid the
2
debtor in retaining property crucial to its business operations.
Current financing is another immediate problem generally
encountered by debtors seeking relief under the Bankruptcy Act.
Obviously, if a debtor's financial condition has become sufficiently serious to require relief, there is likely to be a critical
shortage of working capital. Furthermore, few lenders will be willing to provide loans without some assurance of priority. Under
Chapter XI, this problem is mitigated by the provision permitting immediate action by the trustee.13 During the pendency of
the proceedings, the court can authorize the trustee or debtor in
possession to issue certificates of indebtedness with whatever
agreed-upon priority seems equitable. 4 Chapter X, on the other
hand, compounds the problem of current financing by allowing
the issuance of certificates of indebtedness only after approval of
the petition. However, this approval may be substantially delayed pending a good faith determination which must generally
be made at a judicial hearing. "To a debtor who seeks reorganization only when he is unable to meet this week's payroll, a prospect of a Chapter X court-approved borrowing next month is not
appealing."57
51. Coogan, ProposedAct at 745.
52. Id. According to Mr. Coogan, the court, bound by section 308, must be convinced
that the secured party will not be permanently injured, a matter on which the court and
a secured party may disagree. A secured party may, in some instances, be more or less
"forced" into a position of allowing himself to be "affected" under a Chapter XI arrangement:
[A] secured creditor . . . who is "temporarily" enjoined from repossessing his
collateral may be "persuaded" to accept something less than his full claim by
the debtor's power to take the final step of liquidation bankruptcy. His collateral
may be readily saleable for the amount of the debt secured, but more than likely

it is worth less to a stranger than it is to this debtor if he can be rehabilitated.
For example, a fixture installed on the debtor's premises, or work-in-process
may be worth little apart from the debtor's operations. Pressure of affairs may
lead the secured party to accept something a little more than liquidation value.

Id.
53. Bankruptcy Act § 344, 11 U.S.C. § 744 (1970).
54. Id. See generally White Chem. Co. v. Moradian, 417 F.2d 1015 (9th Cir. 1969).

But see White v. Murtha, 343 F.2d 831 (5th Cir. 1965); In re Delaware Hosiery Mills, 202
F.2d 951 (3d Cir. 1953).
55. Bankruptcy Act § 116(2), 11 U.S.C. § 516(2) (1970).
56. See notes 41-43 and accompanying text supra.
57. Coogan, ProposedAct at 744.
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3.

Jurisdictionand Control of Property

Under both Chapters X and XI, the court in which the petition is filed has exclusive jurisdiction over all property constructively or actually possessed by the debtor as of the date of filing.5
The debtor relinquishes all right of control over its property, and
the court is empowered to resolve all controversies involving such
property. 9 Additionally, the court may appoint a receiver to protect and conserve the debtor's estate prior to petition approval in
a Chapter X proceeding,"° or, in a Chapter XI proceeding, "upon
application of any party in interest

. .

., if necessary.""1

The management, officers, and board of directors of a financially distressed corporation will ordinarily have a very definite
interest in remaining in control of corporate affairs. Unless the
failure was caused directly by management incompetence or dishonesty, a change of control at a financially critical time may be
more detrimental than advantageous. 2 Management, with an
intimate knowledge of the debtor's affairs, may have valuable
contacts with customers which might be severed if control were
placed in a disinterested trustee. 3 Furthermore, delicate negotiations for the sale of certain assets or the borrowing of money may
be endangered by a change in management. 4 For these reasons,
a Chapter XI proceeding in which the debtor customarily remains
in possession 5 will generally be preferred by the debtor and may
often be more advantageous to all interested parties. It should not
be forgotten, however, that a debtor in possession holds the property and conducts business as trustee and is at all times technically subject to court control. 6 On the other hand, a basic tenet
58. Bankruptcy Act §§ 111, 112, 311, 312, 11 U.S.C. §§ 511, 512, 711, 712 (1970).
Although nowhere is the jurisdiction over encumbered property expressly conferred by
statute on a Chapter XI court, the powers granted clearly seem to include such jurisdiction. For an analysis of the problem, see Lockhart v. Garden City Bank & Trust Co., 116
F.2d 658 (2d Cir. 1940), 2 MODERN BANKUuPrcy MANUAL § 1291 (1966) and 9 REMINGTON §
3573.
59. 9 REMINGTON § 3573; 11 REMINGTON § 4358, at 36.
60. Bankruptcy Act §§ 112, 117, 11 U.S.C. §§ 512, 517 (1970).
61. Bankruptcy Act § 332, 11 U.S.C. § 732 (1970).
62. See generally Coogan, ProposedAct at 743-44.
63. See In re KDI Corp., 477 F.2d 726, 734 (6th Cir. 1973).
64. Coogan, ProposedAct at 743.
65. Bankruptcy Act § 342, 11 U.S.C. § 742 (1970). It is within the court's discretion
whether to appoint a trustee or allow the debtor to remain in possession. "In some districts, management is regularly replaced, and in other districts, a receiver is appointed to
meet a special problem." Coogan, Proposed Act at 743.
66. Bankruptcy Act §§ 342, 343, 11 U.S.C. §§ 742, 743 (1970).
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of Chapter X is the change of control, and in any situation where
the liquidated indebtedness of a debtor is $250,000 or more, it is
mandatory that a disinterested87 trustee be appointed to hold the
property and conduct corporate affairs."
C.

The Plans
1.

Chapter XI

The debtor in a Chapter XI proceeding controls the preparation and execution of the plan of arrangement. In its petition for
relief the debtor must set forth the provisions of the arrangement
it proposes or state that it intends to propose an arrangement at
a later date.69 An arrangement can modify only the rights of unsecured creditors; 0 it cannot alter the rights of a secured creditor
unless they are waived.7 Normally, an arrangement does not affect equity holders except through indirect means.7 2 Most arrangements, however, are fairly simple. In one study it was found
that Chapter XI plans are ordinarily of three types:
(1) a composition plan, under which unsecured creditors agree
to accept less than 100 percent payment; (2) an extension plan,
under which unsecured claims are paid in full but over a longer
period of time; and (3) a combination of both."
Regardless of the nature of the plan of arrangement, the debtor
normally remains in possession of its business and is responsible
for executing the plan74 with negligible court intervention.
2.

Chapter X

The court closely controls the preparation and execution of
67. Section 158 of the Bankruptcy Act (11 U.S.C. § 558) sets forth several classes of
individuals who are automatically classified as interested parties.
68. Bankruptcy Act § 156, 11 U.S.C. § 556 (1970).
69. Bankruptcy Act § 323, 11 U.S.C. § 723 (1970).
70. Bankruptcy Act §§ 307(2), 356, 11 U.S.C. §§ 707(2), 756 (1970).
71. Bankruptcy Act § 308, 11 U.S.C. § 708 (1970). See notes 48-49 and accompanying
text supra.
72. In Posi-Seal Int'l v. Chipperfield, 457 F.2d 237 (2d Cir. 1972), a condition precedent to the arrangement was agreement by present stockholders to a distribution of stock
to third parties. After such agreement, the plan was accepted and the courts approved
the arrangement which indirectly affected the stockholders' interests. For further discussion of Posi-Seal see notes 184-89 and accompanying text infra.
73. BROOKINGS REPORT, supra note 3, at 138.
74. If necessary the court may appoint a receiver to assist in the rehabilitation of the
debtor. Bankruptcy Act § 332, 11 U.S.C. § 732 (1970).
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plans under Chapter X. If a trustee has been appointed 5 he has
the responsibility of either formulating the plan for rehabilitation
or reporting to the court why a plan cannot be effected. 8 The
judge sets the time limit within which the trustee must prepare
and file the plan and fixes a hearing date for consideration of the
plan and any objections to it. 7 1 In addition, the judge may direct
the trustee to perform various investigatory functions to determine the desirability of the continuance of the business and any
other matters relevant to the formulation of the plan. 7 The judge
may also require the trustee to inform the creditors, stockholders,
the Securities and Exchange Commission, and other interested
parties concerning the investigation of the debtor. 79 Interested
parties may submit suggestions and proposals for the plan of
rehabilitation to the trustee," but he is ultimately responsible for
preparing the plan and submitting it to the court for approval.
The trustee's proposed plan ordinarily contains some of the
optional provisions specified in section 216 of the Act (11 U.S.C.
§ 616). It must, however, include the mandatory provisions set
forth in that section.2 A modification or alteration of the rights
75. When the debtor continues in possession plans may be filed by the debtor, any
creditor, by a stockholder, or an examiner, if directed to do so by the court. Bankruptcy
Act § 170, 11 U.S.C. § 570 (1970).
76. Bankruptcy Act § 169, 11 U.S.C. § 569 (1970).
77. Id.
78. Bankruptcy Act §§ 167(1) & (2), 11 U.S.C. §§ 567(1) & (2) (1970) provide:
The trustee upon his appointment and qualification-(1) shall, if the judge shall
so direct, forthwith investigate the acts, conduct, property, liabilities, and financial condition of the debtor, the operation of its business and the desirability
of the continuance thereof, and any other matter relevant to the proceeding or
to the formulation of a plan, and report thereon to the judge; (2) may, if the
judge shall so direct, examine the directors and officers of the debtor and any
other witnesses concerning the foregoing matters or any of them ....
79. Bankruptcy Act § 167(5), 11 U.S.C. § 567(5) (1970).
80. Bankruptcy Act § 167(6) (11 U.S.C. § 567(6)) provides that the trustee "shall give
notice to the creditors and stockholders that they may submit to him suggestions for the
formulation of a plan, or proposals in the form of plans, within a time therein named."
81. Bankruptcy Act § 169, 11 U.S.C. § 569 (1970).
82. In 11 REMINGTON § 4568, at 323, the mandatory and optional provisions of section
216 are explained as follows:
The mandatory requirements are:
(1) provisions modifying the rights of secured or unsecured creditors or some
class of them, § 216(1);
(2) provision for the payment of costs, expenses, and allowances, § 216(3);
(3) specification of the claims to be paid in cash in full, if any, § 216(5);
(4) specification of creditors and stockholders, if any, not affected by the plan,
§ 216(6);
(5) provision for the adequate protection for any class of creditors affected by
the plan which does not accept by two-thirds majority, § 216(7);
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of creditors and stockholders, or some class of them, is required.,3
Provisions must be included for payment of all administrative
costs, 4 and the plan must specify which claims are to be paid in
cash in full. 5 The plan must identify the creditors or stockholders
which will be unaffected by its provisions"8 and must also provide
for any class of creditors" or stockholders 8 which, although affected by the plan, refuses to approve it. The plan may also
include any other appropriate provisions consistent with the goals
of reorganization and rehabilitation." Almost "invariably [the
plan] entails a restructuring of the old capital accounts as well
as plans for improving the productivity of the debtor."" The
plans are as varied as the factual circumstances which necessitate
rehabilitation. In short, the trustee is limited only by his imagination and the mandatory provisions of section 216 in his preparation of the plan of reorganization.'
After the plan has been prepared, it must be approved by the
judge before being presented to the creditors and shareholders for
acceptance. This approval is contingent upon compliance with
section 216, and with the "feasibility," and "fair and equitable,"
(6) provision for the adequate protection of any class of stockholders which is
affected and does not accept the plan by the required majority, § 216(8);
(7) provision of adequate means of execution of the plan, § 216(10);
(8) equitable provisions as to the selection of new officers upon the consummation of the plan, § 216(11);
(9) charter amendments or new charters to prohibit the issuing of nonvoting
stock and providing for certain restrictions on stock issues, and for equitable
provisions in securities to be issued, § 216(12); and
(10) if settlement of claims belonging to the estate is not provided for by plan,
the plan must provide for their enforcement by the trustee or by an examiner,
§ 216(13).
The optional features may include only:
(1) provisions modifying the rights of stockholders, § 216(1);
(2) plans may deal with all or any part of the property of the debtor, § 216(2);
(3) executory contracts may be rejected, except contracts in the public authority, § 216(4);
(4) provisions for the retirement of indebtedness, § 216(9);
(5) provisions for the settlement of claims belonging to the debtor, § 216(13);
and
(6) other provisions not inconsistent with Chapter X, § 216(14).
83. Bankruptcy Act § 216(1), 11 U.S.C. § 616(1) (1970).
84. Bankruptcy Act § 216(3), 11 U.S.C. § 616(3) (1970).
85. Bankruptcy Act § 216(5), 11 U.S.C. § 616(5) (1970).
86. Bankruptcy Act § 216(6), 11 U.S.C. § 616(6) (1970).
87. Bankruptcy Act § 216(7), 11 U.S.C. § 616(7) (1970).
88. Bankruptcy Act § 216(8), 11 U.S.C. § 616(8) (1970).
89. Bankruptcy Act § 216(14), 11 U.S.C. § 616(14) (1970).
90. E. ALTMAN, CORPORATE BANKRUPTCY iN AMERICA 8 (1971).
91. See note 83 supra.
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requirements.12 The judge has a great amount of control over a
Chapter X plan by virtue of this power to determine the presence
or absence of these factors. If the plan has been submitted to the
Securities and Exchange Commission,93 then the judge must
await that agency's report94 before approving the plan. 5
For the judge to assess the fairness and feasibility of the plan,
the valuation of the business must be established to determine
interests of secured and unsecured creditors as well as the interests of the various stockholders. This requirement was firmly established in ConsolidatedRock Products Co. v. Du Bois.9" There
the district court had favorably ruled on the fairness of the reorganization plan, but no valuation had been made. In affirming the
Ninth Circuit's reversal, Justice Douglas stated that a valuation
was essential to a fairness determination, saying: "Absent the
requisite valuation data, the [district] court was in no position
to exercise the 'informed independent judgment' which appraisal
of a plan of reorganization entails."9 Furthermore, in order to
accomplish this valuation, some effort was required "to value the
whole enterprise by a capitalization of prospective earnings."9
A valuation is also necessary so that the fairness determination will meet the requirements of the strict or absolute priority
rule. 9 In the context of this rule, the words "fair and equitable"
are "words of art which . . . [have] acquired a fixed meaning
through judicial interpretations in the field of equity receivership
reorganizations," ' and this fixed meaning is that "the stockholder's interest in the property is subordinate to the rights of
creditors."" ° ' Thus, in Chapter X reorganizations, the term "fair
92. Bankruptcy Act § 174, 11 U.S.C. § 574 (1970).
93. Under section 172 of the Bankruptcy Act (11 U.S.C. § 572) the judge may request
the Securities and Exchange Commission to examine and report on the plan if the scheduled indebtedness of the debtor is less than $3,000,000, and must request an examination
and report if the scheduled indebtedness exceeds $3,000,000.
94. The judge may also approve the plan if he has notice that the Securities and
Exchange Commission will not file a report or if the time within which to file the report
has expired. Bankruptcy Act § 174, 11 U.S.C. § 574 (1970).
95. Id.
96. 312 U.S. 510 (1941).
97. Id. at 520 (citations omitted).
98. Id. at 525. This was necessary to determine if the plan conformed to the absolute
priority rule established in Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106 (1939).
Also, a determination must be made concerning which assets are subject to claims of
creditors and stockholders. 312 U.S. at 520.
99. See Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106 (1939).
100. Id. at 115.
101. Id. at 116, quoting from Louisville Trust Co. v. Louisville, New Albany & Chi-
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and equitable" connotes strict priority, and the proper priority
cannot be determined without a valuation. A valuation is also
needed to establish the solvency of the debtor. This is important
because, in a case of actual insolvency, as distinguished from
inability to pay debts, the stockholders are deprived of the right
to participate in the reorganized company and their acceptance
of the plan is not required.' 2
To satisfy the strict priority rule the-judge divides the creditors and stockholders into classes." 3 The claims of a senior class
must be fully satisfied before the claims of a junior class can be
given any consideration." 4 Obviously this means that the claims
and rights of some creditors and stockholders will probably be
eliminated in the plan of reorganization. In essence, "fair and
equitable" means that stockholders and junior creditors can participate in the reorganization plan only if the claims of senior
claimants are fully satisfied.
After making the determination that the plan proposed by
the trustee is "fair and equitable," the judge must determine
whether it is "feasible.11 5 In making this decision the court basically considers whether there is a reasonable prospect that the
debtor will be rehabilitated and will be able to meet its future
financial obligations. ' The focus is not on absolute certainty of
success; rather, the inquiry concerns whether there is reasonable
assurance of success. The purpose of reorganization is to rehabili10 7
tate and not "to place crutches under corporate cripples."
Thus, in determining feasibility the court is concerned with practicability and focuses on whether there is reasonable assurance
that the plan will be consummated.' 8 Once the judge determines
that a plan proposed by the trustee meets the appropriate requirements, ' then he must enter an order approving the plan
cago Ry., 174 U.S. 674, 684 (1899). The court explained that it was decided in Northern
Pacific Ry. v. Boyd, 228 U.S. 482 (1913), that "this doctrine is the 'fixed principle' according to which . . . the character of reorganization plans was to be evaluated." Id.
102. 11 REMINGTON §§ 4575-76.
103. Under section 197 of the Bankruptcy Act (11 U.S.C. § 597) the judge may
summarily divide creditors and stockholders into classes.
104. See 11 REMINGTON §§ 4584-89; 2 MODERN BANKRUPrCY MANUAL §§ 1580, 1585-86
(1966).
105. Bankruptcy Act § 174, 11 U.S.C. § 574 (1970). See notes 122-28 infra for other
discussion of "feasibility."
106. See Consolidated Rock Prods. Co. v. Du Bois, 312 U.S. 510 (1941); In re Barlum
Realty Co., 62 F. Supp. 81 (E.D. Mich. 1945).
107. Price v. Spokane Silver & Lead Co., 97 F.2d 237, 247 (8th Cir. 1938).
108. Id. See also 11 REMINGTON § 4583; 2 MODERN BANKRUPTcY MANUAL § 1581 (1966).
109. See note 93 and accompanying text supra.
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and fixing a time within which the creditors and stockholders
may accept or reject the plan. '
D. Acceptance, Confirmation, and Consummation of a Plan
1. Acceptance
Before an arrangement proposed under Chapter XI can be
confirmed by the court, the plan must be accepted in writing by
a majority, both in number and in amount, of the creditors affected by the arrangement."' Acceptances may be solicited before
or after the filing of the petition for an arrangement."' Under
Chapter X, in order to secure a hearing for consideration of confirmation, the proposed plan must be accepted in writing by creditors holding two-thirds in amount of the claims filed and allowed
of each class."' If the debtor is solvent, the plan must also be
accepted by a majority of each class of stockholders.' Acceptances solicited before the judge has approved a plan under Chapter X are invalid, unless the court had given its consent prior to
the solicitation."' After the requisite votes are secured, the judge
designates a hearing date for consideration of confirmation of the
plan and gives notice of the hearing to all interested parties.' 6
2.

Confirmation

Before a court will confirm11 7 a Chapter XI arrangement, two
110. Id.
111. Bankruptcy Act § 362, 11 U.S.C. § 762 (1970). This section also provides that if
the creditors are divided into classes the plan of arrangement must be accepted in writing
by a majority of each class before the plan can be confirmed. Under section 361 of the
Act (11 U.S.C. § 761) an arrangement may be confirmed at the initial meeting of creditors
if it has been accepted in writing by all creditors affected by it.
112. Bankruptcy Act § 336(4), 11 U.S.C. § 736(4) (1970).
113. Bankruptcy Act § 179, 11 U.S.C. § 579 (1970).
114. Id.
115. Bankruptcy Act § 176, 11 U.S.C. § 576 (1970).
116. Section 179 of the Act requires that notice of the hearing be given "to the debtor,
creditors, stockholders, indenture trustees, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Securities
and Exchange Commission, and such other persons as the judge may designate ...
Bankruptcy Act § 179, 11 U.S.C. § 579 (1970).
117. Bankruptcy Act § 366, 11 U.S.C. § 766 (1970) provides:
The court shall confirm an arrangement if satisfied that(1) the provisions of this chapter have been complied with;
(2) it is for the best interests of the creditors and is feasible;
(3) the debtor has not been guilty of any of the acts or failed to perform any
of the duties which would be a bar to the discharge of a bankrupt; and
(4) the proposal and its acceptance are in good faith and have not been made
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conditions must be satisfied; the arrangement must be "in the
best interests of the creditors," and it must be "feasible." ' One
judicial decision suggested this definition: "To be in the best
interests of creditors the plan must give the creditors more than
they would receive in liquidation.""' A recent commentator, however, noted that the creditor himself is not necessarily the judge
as to what is in his best interest.'20 As for feasibility, no fixed
standard exists; 2,an arrangement is generally considered feasible
if "the creditors

. .

.[are] assured of receiving what is promised

them under the arrangement but it does not require an assurance
of future business success.'

22

In other words, the court's focus in

determining feasibility under Chapter XI is on the likelihood of
payment of creditors, as provided by the plan, rather than on the
probability of the rehabilitation of the corporation.
The standards for confirmation of a Chapter X plan are
much more stringent than those for arrangements.'2 Again, feasior procured by any means, promises, or acts forbidden by this Act.
Confirmation of an arrangement shall not be refused solely because the interest
of a debtor, or if a debtor is a corporation, the interests of its stockholders or
members will be preserved under the arrangement.
118. Id.
119. In re Discon Corp., 346 F. Supp. 839, 841 (S.D. Fla. 1971), citing In re Peoples
Loan & Inv. Co., 410 F.2d 851 (8th Cir. 1969). See also Technical Color & Chem. Works
v. Two Guys From Massapequa, Inc., 327 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1964); In re Stanley Karman,
279 F. Supp. 828 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); 9 COLUER, BANKRUPTCY § 9.17 (14th ed. 1968).
120. Seidman, ChapterX or Chapter XI?, 76 COM. L.J. 33, 34 (1971).
121. The terms "feasibility" and "fair and equitable" are "words [which] have
plagued the courts and they seem to be defined as whatever the sitting tribunal says they
mean to justify the court's ultimate decision in a particular case." Id. at 34-35.
122. In re American Trailer Rentals Co., 325 F.2d 47, 53 (10th Cir. 1963), rev'd on
other grounds, 379 U.S. 594 (1965); accord, In re Slumberland Bedding Co., 115 F. Supp.
39 (D. Md. 1953).
123. Bankruptcy Act § 221, 11 U.S.C. § 621 (1970) provides:
The judge shall confirm a plan if satisfied that(1) the provisions of article VII, section 199, and article X of this chapter have
been complied with;
(2) the plan is fair and equitable, and feasible;
(3) the proposal of the plan and its acceptance are in good faith and have not
been made or procured by means or promises forbidden by this Act;
(4) all payments made or promised by the debtor or by a corporation issuing
securities or acquiring property under the plan or by any other person, for
services and for costs and expenses in, or in connection with, the proceeding or
in connection with the plan and incident to the reorganization, have been fully
disclosed to the judge and are reasonable or, if to be fixed after confirmation of
the plan, will be subject to the approval of the judge; and
(5) the identity, qualifications, and affiliations of the persons who are to be
directors or officers, or voting trustees, if any, upon the consummation of the
plan, have been fully disclosed, and that the appointment of such persons to
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bility' 24 of the plan is a prerequisite to confirmation, but the
courts appear to use this term differently in Chapter X proceedings. The court in In re Barlum Realty Co. 25 gave this definition:
Feasibility means that the reorganized company will emerge in
a solvent condition with reasonable prospects of financial stability and success. Some of the factors to be considered in this
determination involve the soundness of the proposed capital
structure and the ability of the reorganized company to meet its
2
financial obligations at their maturity dates.' 1
Thus, the courts take different approaches in considering the
feasibility of a reorganization plan vis-A-vis a plan of arrangement. An arrangement will be approved as feasible if creditors
will receive what they are promised, but when a plan of reorganization is at issue, the courts consider whether there is a reasonable prospect of the business surviving.'12
The requirement that a plan be "fair and equitable" for confirmation is unique to Chapter X.121 As previously noted,12' the
courts have interpreted "fair and equitable" to require a division
of creditors and stockholders into classes'" where the claims of
each class, from the senior to the junior classification, must be
fully satisfied before another class may receive payment on their
obligations."' In essence, the strict or absolute priority rule requires that parties affected by the reorganization be allowed to
retain the advantage of their respective priorities. Naturally, this
often eliminates some creditors and stockholders from participating in the reorganized business.
such offices, or their continuance therein, is equitable, compatible with the
interests of the creditors and stockholders and consistent with public policy.
124. See notes 106-09 and accompanying text supra for a discussion of "feasibility"
at time of approval of plans.
125. 62 F. Supp. 81 (E.D. Mich. 1945).
126. Id. at 87. See Consolidated Rock Prods. Co. v. Du Bois, 312 U.S. 510, 525 (1941).
127. It appears that the courts do focus on the prospect of business survival when
considering the "feasibility" of proposed plans of reorganization. The statistical data in
note 22 and the accompanying text supra indicate that approximately one-fourth of the
businesses succeeded that went through a reorganization during the study period.
128. The "fair and equitable" standard is included in section 221(2) of Chapter X
(11 U.S.C. § 621(2)) and was included in section 366(4) of Chapter XI until 1952, when it
was deleted by statute. 66 STAT. 433 (1952).
129. See notes 102-05 and accompanying text supra.
130. The division of creditors and stockholders into classes is summarily performed
by the judge under section 197 of the Act (11 U.S.C. § 597).
131. Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106 (1939). See also 11
REMINGTON §§ 4584-89; 2 MODERN BANKRupTcY MANUAL §§ 1580-86 (1966).
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In some cases a majority of senior creditors or stockholders
may favor the participation of junior creditors or stockholders
without following strict priority, but this is not permissible. Adherence to the strict priority rule is absolutely necessary for a plan
to be "fair and equitable." Thus, even where a plan is overwhelmingly supported by creditors it cannot be confirmed if it violates
their priority rights.'32
3.

Consummation

Upon confirmation, the provisions of an arrangement under
Chapter XI are binding on the debtor and all of its creditors,
whether or not they have accepted it.' 3 After confirmation, parties entitled to payment for priority debts and for costs and expenses incident to the arrangement are paid from the money that
was previously deposited into the court by the debtor.'34 The consideration for the arrangement is then distributed to the creditors
whose claims were filed timely and allowed under the Act.' u Finally, the court dismisses the case' 6 and the debtor is discharged
from all its unsecured debt provided for by the arrangement.'3 7
Upon confirmation of a plan of reorganization under Chapter
X, its provisions become binding upon the debtor and any corporation created by the plan.'38 It is also binding upon all creditors
and stockholders of the debtor, whether or not they have accepted
it.' 3 The debtor or any corporation created to execute the plan
must comply with the provisions of the plan and take all action
necessary to carry it out. 4 ' If the plan requires payments to creditors and stockholders, then such payments shall be made as the
judge directs.'
After the plan of reorganization has been consummated, the
judge enters a final decree discharging the debtor from its debts
132, See Sophian v. Congress Realty Co., 98 F.2d 499 (8th Cir. 1938); Price v. Spokane Silver & Lead Co., 97 F.2d 237 (8th Cir. 1938); In re Barclay Park Corp., 90 F.2d
595 (2d Cir. 1937).
133. Bankruptcy Act § 367(1), 11 U.S.C. § 767(1) (1970).
134. Bankruptcy Act § 367(2), 11 U.S.C. § 767(2) (1970). The debtor is required to
deposit money necessary to pay the costs and expenses of the arrangement proceedings
prior to confirmation under section 337(2) of the Act (11 U.S.C. § 737(2)).
135. Bankruptcy Act § 367(3), 11 U.S.C. § 767(3) (1970).
136. Bankruptcy Act § 367(4), 11 U.S.C. § 767(4) (1970).
137. Bankruptcy Act § 371, 11 U.S.C. § 771 (1970).
138. Bankruptcy Act § 224(1), 11 U.S.C. § 624(1) (1970).
139. Id.
140. Bankruptcy Act § 224(2), 11 U.S.C. § 624(2) (1970).
141. Bankruptcy Act § 224(3)-(4), 11 U.S.C. § 624(3)-(4) (1970).
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and terminating all rights of stockholders, except as provided in
the plan."' The court then discharges the trustee, makes provisions for injunctions and other necessary equitable relief, and
closes the estate."' At this time the debtor hopefully is well on
its way to becoming a viable corporation.
E. The Role of the Securities and Exchange Commission
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), if it feels
that the debtor seeking relief under Chapter XI should be under
Chapter X, may apply to the court to transfer the proceeding.'
If the court agrees, it will either dismiss the Chapter XI proceedings, or allow the petition to be amended to comply with the
requirements of Chapter X.'11 In most cases the management of
the debtor corporation prefers a Chapter XI proceeding as an
arrangement is ordinarily faster and less expensive than a reorganization. The debtor retains possession of its business 4 ' and
normally formulates the rehabilitation plan to be employed. 4 ,
Further, in an arrangement only the interests of unsecured creditors can be affected by the plan. 4 ' On the other hand, a reorganization under Chapter X is closely controlled by the court. A disinterested trustee is usually appointed' who assumes control of the
debtor"' and prepares the plan of reorganization. 5 ' Even debt
and equity holders may be affected by the proposed plan.' 2 The
court closely supervises the preparation and execution of the
plan."13 Furthermore, the SEC is an interested party in Chapter
X reorganizations," 4 although only as an advisor. 5' While the
SEC is not responsible for formulating a plan, it is expected to
142. Bankruptcy Act § 228(1), 11 U.S.C. § 628(1) (1970). The court may make binding provisions for creditors and stockholders in its order confirming the plan or directing
the transfer or retention of property.
143. Bankruptcy Act § 228(2)-(4), 11 U.S.C. § 628(2)-(4) (1970).
144. Bankruptcy Act § 328, 11 U.S.C. § 728 (1970).
145. Id.
146. Bankruptcy Act § 332, 11 U.S.C. § 732 (1970).
147. Bankruptcy Act § 323, 11 U.S.C. § 723 (1970).
148. Bankruptcy Act §§ 307(2), 356, 11 U.S.C. §§ 707(2), 756 (1970). For further
discussion see notes 70-71 and accompanying text supra.
149. Bankruptcy Act § 156, 11 U.S.C. § 556 (1970).
150. Bankruptcy Act § 189, 11 U.S.C. § 589 (1970).
151. Bankruptcy Act § 169, 11 U.S.C. § 569 (1970).
152. See note 84 and accompanying text supra.
153. See notes 76-82 and accompanying text supra.
154. Bankruptcy Act §§ 172-73, 11 U.S.C. §§ 572-73 (1970).
155. .Bankruptcy Act § 172, 11 U.S.C. § 572 (1970).
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file a report with the judge to assist him in deciding whether a
proposed plan complies with the Act, and is fair and equitable,
and feasible. 5 '
Obviously, a debtor would normally prefer to proceed under
Chapter XI. The Supreme Court has said, however, that the
types of relief afforded by the chapters are not alternate routes
to rehabilitation, but "[r]ather . . . they are legally, mutually
exclusive paths to . . . financial rehabilitation.' 1 57 Thus, if a

debtor has attempted to proceed under Chapter XI and the SEC
has intervened to remove it to a Chapter X proceeding then the
court must determine the proper avenue of relief.' This determination may be a significant problem where the proceeding involves a medium-sized corporation.'59 Normally, no problem arises with small corporations with few shareholders because there
is little public interest involved and Chapter XI arrangements
can usually provide the needed relief. Similarly, large corporations with complicated debt structures that have severe financial
problems must generally proceed under the stricter requirements
of Chapter X.
It is often difficult to determine which method of rehabilitation the court will deem proper. The first case in which the SEC
advocated the transfer of a Chapter XI proceeding to Chapter X
was SEC v. United States Realty & Improvement Co. "IThe Supreme Court faced two issues: whether Chapter XI would provide
the debtor adequate relief, and whether the SEC was entitled to
intervene in the proceeding. The Court concluded that the debtor
could not obtain adequate relief under Chapter XI because its
complicated debt structure had to be readjusted and the proposed plan would alter the rights of stockholders. Additionally,
the proposed plan did not meet the "fair and equitable" standard
which was required by Chapter XI. The Court indicated that a
Chapter XI arrangement would be appropriate "where there are
no public or private interests involved requiring protection by the
procedure and remedies afforded by Chapter X."''1 The Court
also ruled that the SEC could intervene in Chapter XI proceed62
ings to protect the public's interest.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

Bankruptcy Act §§ 173-74, 11 U.S.C. §§ 573-74 (1970).
SEC v. American Trailer Rentals Co., 379 U.S. 594, 607 (1965).
See Bankruptcy Act § 328, 11 U.S.C. § 728 (1970).
See Seidman, ChapterX or ChapterXI?, 76 CoM. L.J. 33 (1971).
310 U.S. 434 (1940).
Id. at 454.
The right of the SEC to intervene in Chapter XI was never seriously challenged
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Since the Court failed to formulate a workable test for the
selection of the proper chapter, more litigation followed. In
General Stores v. Shelensky,'6' Justice Douglas, writing for the
Court, established what has become known as the "needs" test
to determine the appropriate chapter for relief. He indicated that
in United States Realty it had been argued "that it is the character of the debtor that determines whether Chapter X or Chapter
XI affords the appropriate remedy."' 64 The same argument was
advanced in General Stores. Justice Douglas explained that the
Court had not adopted that view in United States Realty, but had
emphasized the need to determine on the facts of the case
whether the formulation of a plan under the control of the
debtor, as provided by Chapter XI, or the formulation of a plan
under the auspices of disinterested trustees, as assured by Chapter X and the other protective provisions of that chapter, would
better serve "the public' and
private interests concerned includ' 65
ing those of the debtor. '

He added, "The essential difference is not between the small
company and the large company but between the needs to be
served."'66 Justice Douglas noted that Chapter X was a more
adequate remedy (1) when it was necessary to readjust the debts
of the insolvent company and apply the fair and equitable doctrine; (2) when the debt structure had to be readjusted; (3) when
an accounting for management misdeeds was needed; and (4)
when new management was necessary. 67
Probably the most notable interpretation of the "needs" test
is that of Judge Friendly in SEC v. CanandaiguaEnterprises
Corp."6 In analyzing its merits he said:
Although the "needs" test yields fairly certain and predictable
results in cases at the ends of the spectrum, it is a highly erratic
guide in the broad middle range. No one would doubt that a
seriously embarrassed giant corporation, with secured and unsecured publicly held debt, trade and general creditors, and preferred and common stock, "needs" reorganization under Chapafter United States Realty and in 1952 section 328 of the Bankruptcy Act (11 U.S.C. §
728) was enacted authorizing intervention by the SEC.
163. 350 U.S. 462 (1956).
164. Id. at 465.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 466.
167. Id. at 466-67.
168. 339 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1964).
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ter X; no one would doubt either that a small company requiring
nothing more than a moratorium from trade creditors "needs"
only the swift and simple procedures of Chapter XI."1
He first explained that in some cases the debtor "needs" features
of both chapters such as the protective procedures and remedies
of Chapter X and the speed and simplicity of Chapter XI. He
observed:
The "needs" for the two chapters are not only conflicting but
largely imponderable; we know of no scale sufficiently sensitive
to weigh the near certainty of achieving a Chapter XI arrangement that may not be altogether fair and equitable against the
possible emergence of a better plan from a Chapter X proceeding during which the patient may die before an operating room
is ready or for which the fees of the surgeon and others in attendance may exceed the patient's means.'
Even though few creditors or stockholders opposed the proposed
arrangement in Canandaigua,Judge Friendly felt compelled to
transfer the proceeding to Chapter X because, under the arrangein
ment, publicly held debt was being subjected to adjustments
71
violation of the fair and equitable standard of Chapter X.1
Shortly after Canandaigua,the Supreme Court again addressed the chapter selection issue in SEC v. American Trailer
Rentals Co. 72 Basically, the Court reaffirmed the principles
enunciated in United States Realty and General Stores and emphasized that the two chapters provided distinct methods of rehabilitation and were not alternate routes to the same goal. 73 The
Court expressly reiterated the principle that "as a general rule
Chapter X is the appropriate proceeding for adjustment of publicly held debt."'7 4 Explaining General Stores, the Court stated,
"'Simple' compositions are still to be effected under Chapter
XI. ' ' 1 Public debt could be directly affected by a Chapter XI
proceeding
where the public investors are few in number and familiar with
the operations of the debtor, or where, although the public
investors are greater in number, the adjustment of their debt is
169. Id. at 18.
170. Id. at 19.
171. Id. at 21.
172. 379 U.S. 594 (1965).

173. Id. at 607.
174. Id. at 613.
175. Id. at 614.
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relatively minor, consisting, for example, of a short extension of
time for payment."7 6
Interpreting General Stores the Court remarked:
Chapter X is . . . the appropriate proceeding where the debtor
has widespread public stockholders and the protections of the
public and private interests involved afforded by Chapter X are
required because, for example, there is evidence of management
misdeeds for which an accounting must be made, there is a need
for new management, or the financial condition of the debtor
requires more than a simple composition of its unsecured
debts."'
The SEC argued in American Trailer Rentals that all proceedings involving public debt had to be brought under Chapter
X because its right to intervene in Chapter XI proceedings was
limited to a request for removal of the proceeding to Chapter X.1
The Court rejected this argument saying that, while the SEC did
not have statutory responsibilities under Chapter XI, the SEC
could intervene and be heard in Chapter XI proceedings.' 79
A review of several cases since American Trailer Rentals
shows that the chapter selection issue is not yet settled. In
Normal Finance & Thrift Corp. v. SEC,' the Tenth Circuit
granted the SEC's motion to dismiss the Chapter XI proceeding
initiated by the debtor. The arrangement proposed by the debtor
had been accepted "by the requisite number and dollar volume
of the unsecured creditors."'"' Purporting to follow American
Trailer Rentals, the court ruled that the debtor would have to
proceed under Chapter X to get rehabilitative relief. The court's
decision seemed to be based on the creditors' lack of sophistication and the type of investments involved.12 Considering the facts
of the case, this was probably the best result; however, it appears
that the court could easily have declared that the proposal was a
simple composition and allowed it to remain in Chapter XI.' 83
176. Id.
177. Id. at 615.
178. Id. at 612.
179. Id. at 613.
180. 415 F.2d 1199 (10th Cir. 1969).
181. Id. at 1202.
182. Id. at 1203. The court also cited prior misdeeds of management as a reason for
transferral to Chapter X, but that did not appear to be the primary reason.
183. Id. at 1204. This is true because there were relatively few creditors involved from
a small geographic area and the plan had been accepted.
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The extent of SEC involvement is not limited to requests for
transfers of proceedings. In Posi-Seal International, Inc. v.
Chipperfield,'84 the circuit court asked for the SEC's opinion on
the propriety of a Chapter XI proceeding, and its resulting amicus curiae brief supported confirmation of the plan.'85 After an
arrangement plan had been approved, an action for removal was
initiated by a shareholder of the debtor alleging that the plan
affected the rights of shareholders. In order for the plan to be
approved, there was to be a "reverse split of the debtor's stock
• . . [with a] distribution of a large part of it to third parties.","

Obviously, this affected the rights of stockholders,'81 but the court
found the reverse split to be "a condition precedent to the consummation of the plan and not created by the terms of the arrangement." '88 Since there were approximately 1,700 shareholders and 4,874,174 shares of common stock outstanding,' 8' it is
arguable that the public interest was so great that the case should
have been transferred to Chapter X. The court, however, took a
pragmatic view of the proceedings and allowed the arrangement
to stand since there was no indication of management wrongdoings.
The Sixth Circuit appeared to take a pragmatic view of a
rehabilitation proceeding in the case of In re KDI Corp.' In 1969
KDI had sales of approximately $140,000,000 and earnings of over
$5,000,000 but by August of 1970 the company did not have funds
to pay its current obligations."' New management was installed
and on December 30, 1971, a petition was filed under Chapter XI
along with a proposed plan of arrangement. By October 29, 1971,
a majority in number and amount of each class of creditors had
approved the plan. It was admitted that the plan would cause
significant changes in the capital structure of the debtor. The
appellants contended that the "arrangement.

.

. [was] actually

a reorganization and that the capital structure of KDI . . .
[was] too complex for proceedings under Chapter XI."" 2 The
court rejected the argument. Concluding that all of the debt sub184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

457 F.2d 237 (2d Cir. 1972).
Id. at 238.
Id.
See note 72 and accompanying text supra.
457 F.2d at 238.
Id.
477 F.2d 726 (6th Cir. 1973).
Id. at 728.
Id. at 735.
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ject to the arrangement was unsecured and that the new management was correcting past mistakes, the court ruled that the Chapter XI arrangement was appropriate. Apparently the crucial consideration was the fact that the arrangement was working. Accordingly, the court declined to disturb the arrangement, distinguishing Normal Finance & Thrift Corp.193
The cases since American Trailer Rentals indicate that the
lower courts still have problems deciding which of the two methods of corporate rehabilitation is the appropriate one in a given
case. It appears that the courts are pragmatic and if the arrangement is likely to succeed they allow it to be consummated. 94'
Obviously, better guidelines are needed to prevent the unnecessary cost of litigation incurred in determining the appropriate
chapter for relief.
I.

PROBLEMS OF THE PRESENT SYSTEM
AND PROPOSED CHAPTER VII

On its face, Chapter VII of the proposed Bankruptcy Act, as
a consolidation of present Chapters X, XI, and XII, would avoid
the litigation costs sustained in resolving the chapter selection
issue. Considerable debate exists, however, as to whether the proposed act would solve other problems present in the existing law,
some a product of the present bankruptcy system generally and
others peculiar to Chapters X and XI.' 95 Acknowledging the inadequacies of the structure in its present form, Congress commissioned a group to examine the existing system and to formulate
193. The court was well aware of the fact that the new president and chief executive
officer of KDI had indicated that he would leave the company if the proceeding was
transferred to Chapter X. Also, the banks, who were the largest creditors of KDI, notified
the referee that adjustments of the terms of their loans were contingent on remaining in
Chapter XI. Id. at 734.
194. See, e.g., In re KDI Corp., 477 F.2d 726 (6th Cir. 1973); Posi-Seal Int'l, Inc. v.
Chipperfield, 457 F.2d 237 (2d Cir. 1972). But see In re Arlan's Dept. Stores, Inc., 373 F.
Supp. 520 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). See generally Weintraub & Levin, Chapter WI (Reorganizations) As Proposed by the Bankruptcy Commission: The Widening Gap Between Theory
and Reality, 47 AM. BANK L.J. 323 (1973).
195. Compare Cyr, The Bankruptcy Act of 1973: Back to the DraftingBoard, 48 AM.
BANK. L.J. 45 (1974); Weintraub & Crames, Critiqueof Chapter WI and Related Sections
of the Proposed Bankruptcy Act of 1973, 48 AM. BANK. L.J. 1 (1974); Weintraub & Levin,
Chapter VII (Reorganizations)As Proposed by the Bankruptcy Commission: The Widening Gap Between Theory and Reality, 47 Am. BANK. L.J. 323 (1973), with King, The
Business ReorganizationChapterof the ProposedBankruptcy Code-Or Whatever Happened to ChaptersX, XI, and XII, 78 Com. L.J. 429-36 (1973); Trost, CorporateReorganizations Upder Chapter WI of the "BankruptcyAct of 1973": Another View, 48 AM. BANK.
L.J. 111 (1974).
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a feasible alternative which would eliminate its negative aspects.'90 A House Judiciary Committee Report asserted "that the
present body of laws comprising our bankruptcy system is obsolete, highly uneconomical, and incapable of adequately conforming to the requirements of our modern economy. 1 19 7 Among the

reasons for revision of the Bankruptcy Act enumerated in the
congressional resolution to create the bankruptcy commission' 8
were the following: (1) the significant change in social and economic conditions in this country in the more than 30 years since
the last major revision of the Act; (2) the fact that more than onefourth of the referees encounter difficulties in performing their
duties. Thus, substantial improvements in the Act were
needed.' 9 An exhaustive study undertaken by the Brookings Institution"'0 delineated many of the undesirable features inherent
in current bankruptcy law.01 Prominent among the shortcomings
is the discrepancy from state to state and district to district in
the application of state and federal law,

22

e.g., priority rules

which vary among the states and the diversity in district court
judges' policies as to allowing a debtor to remain in possession in
a Chapter XI proceeding. Many judges permit a debtor to retain
control of a business almost as a matter of course, while others
generally appoint a trustee." 3 Other problems pointed out in the
Brookings study include the following: (1) inadequate representation of debtors by attorneys who use little imagination and fail
to question valuations, lien validity, etc.; (2) use of the adversary
system in situations where minimal adversary interest, if any,
exists; (3) management by referees, trustees, and the bankruptcy
196. "The Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States was
established by Public Law 91-354 (84 Stat. 468) effective July 24, 1970. The
Commission, however, did not become fully operational until June 1, 1971. On
July 30, 1973, two years and two months after it began its studies, the Commission filed its Report with the President, the Congress, and the Chief Justice of
the United States."
I COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 10, at v.
197. HoUsE COMM.ON THE JUDIcIARY, REPORT ON BANKRUvPTcY, H.R. Doc. No. 91-927,
91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1970).

198. S.J. Res. 88, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
199. Id.
200. BROOKINGs REPORT, supra note 3, at 197.
201. For a strong disagreement with the Brookings findings and conclusions, particularly with the view on the administrative nature of bankruptcy proceedings, see Revit,

Bankruptcy Administrationand the Brookings Report-A CriticalAnalysis, 77 CoM. L.J.
179 (1972).
202. See BROOKINGS REPORT, supra note 3, at 197.
203. See generally Seidman, Chapter X or ChapterXI?, 76 CoM. L.J. 33 (1971).
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bar which fails to properly serve debtors, creditors, or the public,
and which is "categorized by loose supervision, infrequent field
examinations, little concern for qualifications of personnel,
archaic procedure, high costs, and unwarranted delays." ' 4 With
regard to excessive administrative costs, the authors of the Brookings report found that
[o]ver 70 percent of all bankruptcy cases have no assets left
after exempt property is set aside and pay neither administrative costs nor creditors. In just over half of the rest, administrative costs consume the excess assets. Thus creditors receive payment in approximately 15 percent of the cases. In this last
group, administrative costs consume an average of one-quarter
of the assets.0 5
It was further concluded that the above mentioned deficiencies
"are the natural result of using a judicial system to try to solve
problems that are by nature administrative." ' With regard to
Chapters X and XI, an important concern was the fact that there
were relatively few successful rehabilitations. The Brookings
group criticized administrative inefficiencies as being the primary factor in the vast majority of the ills of the system.0 7
After more than two years of hearings, study, and careful
deliberation, the Commission on Bankruptcy Laws submitted its
report and recommendations. Harold Marsh, Chairman of the
Commission, explained the report as follows in his letter of transmittal to the President, the Chief Justice of the United States,
and the Congress:
Part I consists of an analysis and evaluation of the present system of bankruptcy administration in the United States and our
recommendations for changes therein to reflect and adequately
meet the demands of present technical, financial, and commercial activities. Part II consists of the text of proposed statutory
changes to effectuate our recommendations, including a new
"Bankruptcy Act of 1973" (together with explanatory notes).0 '
The proposed Act (Part II of the Commission's report) would
drastically alter both current procedures and certain substantive
aspects of corporate debtor rehabilitation. As far as struggling
204. BROOKINOS REPOaRT, supra note 3, at 197.
205. Id. at 4.

206. Id. at 197-98.
207. Id. at 198.
208. .1 COMMIssioN

REPORT,

supra note 10, Letter of Transmittal.

Published by Scholar Commons, 1976

29

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 4 [1976], Art. 9
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27

businesses are concerned, the major changes include the proposed
creation of a Bankruptcy Administration under Chapter IV and
the consolidation of present Chapters X, XI, and XII into the
proposed Chapter VII. The proposed Bankruptcy Administration
would be "empowered to handle almost all matters in proceedings under the Act which do not involve litigation. 0'2 9 This proposal was adopted in response to criticism that the current system requires the district judge and referee to perform both judicial and administrative functions. Some writers suggest that the
two functions should be separated-that a judge or referee should
not be placed in the position of supervising the operation of an
estate as well as adjudicating the disputes arising in connection
therewith."' The referee is faced with an almost intolerable burden of performing the judicial functions increasingly entrusted to
hiM2 1' while at the same time performing his normal tedious administrative responsibilities." ' Under the proposed Act, the Bankruptcy Administrators
would assume many of the duties presently performed by referees, trustees, receivers, appraisers, accountants, and attorneys. 23
In short, a corps of in-house professional and clerical employees,
replacing the present combination of professionals selected on
a non-merit basis and individuals from private practice, would
execute most of the duties of the Administration outlined in the
proposed Act. However, the Administration would also be authorized to employ outside professionals (such as attorneys, accountants, auctioneers, and appraisers) where this would be
more economical or efficient .2
The concept of an agency under the auspices of the executive
branch to administer all bankruptcy cases has aroused great an209. Id. at 7.
210. See I COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 10, at 5; King, The Business Reorganization Chapter of the Proposed Bankruptcy Code-Or Whatever Happened to Chapters X,
XI, and XII, 78 COM. L.J. 429-36 (1973); Trost, Corporate Reorganizations Under Chapter
VII of the "Bankruptcy Act of 1973": Another View, 48 AM. BANK. L.J. 111 (1974).
211. Cyr, Bankruptcy Courts in Transition Toward Debtor Rehabilitation, 22 ME. L.
REV. 333, 357 (1970); Seligson, Major Problems for Consideration by the Commission on
the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States, 45 AM. BANK. L.J. 73 (1971).
212. See generally Seligson, Major Problems for Consideraton by the Commission on
the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States, 45 Am. BANK. L.J. 73 (1971); Levit,
Bankruptcy Administration and the Brookings Report-A Critical Analysis, 77 CoM. L.J.
179, 180-81 (1972).
213. I COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 10, at 7.
214. Id.
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tagonism. 25 "The administrator not only will assume all of the
present administrative responsibilities of bankruptcy judges, but
many of his powers are judicial, as well. 21 6 There is some question whether this government bureaucracy would be far more
27
costly and inefficient than the system it is designed to replace.
Another major controversial proposal is the consolidation of
Chapters X, XI, and XI 2 '8 into a single chapter (Chapter VII)
designed to allow more flexibility. Chapters X and XI, as they
presently exist, have been the focus of considerable criticism on
various counts. Among the targets of attack have been: (1) the
"fair and equitable" doctrine (absolute priority rule); (2) the
varying feasibility standard; (3) the requirement that a debtor be
removed from control in almost all Chapter X proceedings; and
(4) SEC intervention to transfer a proceeding from Chapter X to
Chapter XI. 219 It has been argued that the SEC role in this respect
215. Seidman, The Bankruptcy Act of 1973-A Critique, 79 Coi. L.J. 297, 299 (1974).
This article also said that "[b]ecause of the violent reaction to the proposal for a national
director, the chairman and the staff of the House Subcommittee which is considering the
proposed bill have spread the word that they are not committed to the concept and have
invited alternative proposals." Id. See also Hertzberg & Weingarten, The Powers of the
Administrator under the ProposedBankruptcy Act, 79 Coi. L.J. 82 (1974).
216. Seidman, The Bankruptcy Act of 1973-A Critique, 79 CoM. L.J. 297, 299 (1974).
Seidman has also stated:
The administrator would be authorized, at various times required, to serve as
judge, litigant, counsellor to debtors, advisor and consultant to creditors,
appointeeof fiduciaries, clerk of the court, trustee, receiver, distributingagent,
court advisor, liquidator,appraiser,rulemaker, and regulator of fees ....
Id. Situations in which the administrator performs these functions are replete in the
proposed Act. For example, the administrator would act as a judge under the following
sections of the proposed Act: 7-102 (determines the necessity for a trustee); 7-302 (creates
classifications of creditors and equity holders); 7-103(a)(6) (may allow trustee to examine
witnesses). He may act as a litigant under: 2-205 (can be heard on approval and acceptance of a plan); 7-310(b) (may object to confirmation of the plan). He may act as an
advisor and consultant to creditors under: 7-101(d)(3) (consults with creditors committee
as to administration of the estate); 7-101(d)(4) (meets with committee to review financial
condition of debtor and to consider appointment of trustee). He may act as trustee under:
7-103(b) (if no trustee appointed, administrator may perform all of duties of trustee
outlined in 7-103(a)). There is no question that the administration is given broad, pervasive powers in the proposed Act.
217. See generally Seidman, The Bankruptcy Act of 1973-A Critique, 79 Com. L.J.
297 (1974).
218. Although Chapter XII provides a form of rehabilitation for business debtors, it
is not available to corporations; thus, it has not been treated in this paper. See note 10
supra.
219. According to one author:
One may argue that a petition by the SEC under § 328 of the Bankruptcy Act
to dismiss a Chapter XI case and basically to convert it to Chapter X is no real
problem today, on the ground that such petitions are rare due to an enlightened
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has resulted in unnecessary and costly litigation causing enormous administrative expenses and prejudicial delay in implementing a plan. In Senate hearings prior to the establishment of
the Bankruptcy Commission, the need for revision of Chapters X
and XI was advanced."' Asa S. Herzog, Referee in Bankruptcy
for the Southern District of New York, stated:
Chapter XI cases have been frequently converted to Chapter X
proceedings at the instance of the Securities and Exchange
Commission on the theory that only such a move will protect
public investors. In truth and in fact, in almost all these cases
the investors are ultimately left out in the cold whereas in Chapter XI proceedings they could have participated in the rehabilitated company.22 '

Proposed Chapter VII would eliminate the problem of SEC
intervention to transfer a proceeding from Chapter XI to Chapter
X. All cases of corporate rehabilitation would be handled under
Chapter VII. The administrator would assume the current role of
the SEC of protecting the public's interest in corporate rehabili22 Some
tation."
question remains, however, whether the proposed
Bankruptcy Administration can fulfill the role of the SEC. 23
Proposed Chapter VII provides a compromise between Chapter X's compulsory change of control and Chapter XI's usual
practice of management control.2 4 The administrator is vested
with considerable discretion as to whether to appoint a trustee
regardless of the amount of the debt."5 Normally the estate will
attitude of the SEC allowing larger public corporations to remain in Chapter
XI. One could, however, also argue that the decrease in the number of such
petitions is more due to the understaffing of the SEC. Or, it could be asked, who
kept pushing and for what reason, for a Chapter X-2?
King, The Business ReorganizationChapterof the ProposedBankruptcy Code-Or Whatever Happened to ChaptersX, XI, and XII, 78 CoM. L.J. 429, 430 n.3 (1973).
220. Hearings on S.J. Res. 100 Before the Subcomm. on Bankruptcy of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968).
221. Id. at 8. These sentiments were echoed by Daniel R. Cowans, Referee in Bankruptcy, San Jose, California. Id. at 17.
222. See notes 156-58 and accompanying text supra on the SEC's advisory role in
current Chapter X proceedings.
223. Basically the two arguments against excluding the SEC are: (1) if the debt is
publicly held, then the SEC is probably familiar with the corporation, and (2) the SEC
has had 30 years of experience regulating securities and assisting corporate rehabilitation.
It therefore seems spurious to create and use a new government bureaucracy as a substitute for a highly respected and efficient organization. See generally Weintraub & Levin,
Chapter VII (Reorganizations)as Proposed by the Bankruptcy Commission,47 Am. BANK.
L.J. 323, 331 (1973).
224. Coogan, ProposedAct at 742-44.
225. II COMMISSION REPoirr, supra note 10, at 221 (§ 7-102 Bankruptcy Act of 1973).
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be managed by the administrator unless a particular need for a
trustee is established. If the business has debts of $1,000;000 or
more and 300 or more security holders, a trustee must be appointed unless the court finds that protection offered by an
independent trustee is unnecessary or inordinately expensive.',
This provision has been criticized as one which would in practice
lead to the appointment of a trustee in all cases involving a publicly held corporation and would result in the administrator's
recommendation being practically controlling." ' In theory, however, the section appears logically sound and would not necessarily be subject to the abuses hypothesized by some authors. To the
contrary, it may prove move flexible and desirable than the present system.
As in present Chapters X and XI, Chapter VII would embody
' The
a requirement of feasibility for confirmation of a plan. 28
notes to the proposed Act, however, expressly reject the Chapter
XI feasibility standard (the likelihood that the creditors will re2 9
ceive what is promised them under the plan).1
Instead, the

Chapter X interpretation of feasibility is adopted which requires
a likelihood of a successful rehabilitation. 30 Critics of this proposal have asserted that such a standard eliminates desirable
flexibility currently available under Chapter XI.21 This argument
addresses itself to the desirability of standards and procedures
allowing for slow liquidation which is supposedly not contemplated under the present Act and which would be precluded
2
under Chapter V1I.

23

226. Id.
227. Weintraub & Levin, Chapter VII (Reorganizations)As Proposed by the Bankruptcy Commission: The Widening Gap Between Theory and Reality, 47 AM. BANK L.J.
323, 325 (1973).
228. 1I COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 10, at 252 (§ 7-310(d)(2)(A) Bankruptcy Act
of 1973). See also Coogan, ProposedAct at 751.
229. II COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 10, at 254 (§ 7-310(d)(2)(A), Note 8, Bankruptcy Act of 1973).
230. Id. Note 8 states in part: "If a debtor has no hope of continuing, liquidiation
should occur in order to prevent loss to future creditors and investors." For a discussion
of the Chapter X feasibility requirement see notes 106-09 and 125-28 and accompanying
text supra.
231. See Weintraub & Levin, Chapter VII (Reorganizations) As Proposed by the
Bankruptcy Commission: The Widening Gap Between Theory and Reality, 47 AM. BANK.
L.J. 323, 332 (1973).
232. For other discussion of slow liquidations under the present Act see notes 20-28
and accompanying text supra. But see Coogan, ProposedAct at 753, where Mr. Coogan
states:
Section 7-112 would seem to allow a procedure of slow liquidation until it ap-
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The proposed Chapter VII envisions the use of a modified
version of the strict priority rule presently used in Chapter X
proceedings to determine the fairness of plans of reorganization.233
The "best interests of creditors" standard of the present Chapter
XI is abandoned in favor of applying the fair and equitable doctrine to all plans of reorganizations .2 Perhaps the greatest modification to the existing strict priority rule would be that a plan
could be approved if "there is a reasonable basis for the valuation
on which the plan is based.

' 235

While the proposed Act is not

intended to alter the principle that senior interests participate
prior to juniors, it would allow the court "more leeway in arriving
at an informed estimate of valuation."' 5 This would appear to
encourage competing interests to negotiate the valuation of the
debtor. Such a process probably would lead to higher valuations
and allow more creditors to participate in the reorganized business. However, senior claimants are likely to object to this approach because they may feel undercompensated because of the
higher valuations. Other probable points of controversy are that
the proposal specifically allows possible participation at a future
date by interests initially precluded 7 and allows ownership to
participate in violation of strict priority if the participation is
supported by a contribution to the plan.28 Obviously, the proposed "fair and equitable" standard could be a major source of
litigation if the proposed Act is adopted. However, if it is judicially construed to allow Chapter XI type arrangements, and if
standards are developed for valuations, then the adoption of this
doctrine to determine the fairness of plans should be an improvepeared unreasonable to assume that a plan would be effectuated, in which case
that section would allow a conversion into a Chapter V (liquidation) proceeding
or a dismissal.
233. II COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 10, at 241-42, 252, 254 (§§ 7-310(d)(2)(B), 7303(3) & (4), and § 7-310, Notes 6 & 9, Bankruptcy Act of 1973). For a detailed discussion
of the strict priority rule and the proposed rule under Chapter VII, see Note, The Bankruptcy Act: Changes in the Absolute PriorityRule for CorporateReorganizations,87 HAav.
L. REV. 1786 (1974).
234. II COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 10, at 254 (§ 7-310, Note 6, Bankruptcy Act
of 1973). One author feels that the proposed Chapter VII would not eliminate Chapter XI
type arrangements. King, The Business Reorganization Chapterof the Proposed Bankruptcy Code-Or Whatever Happened to Chapters X, XI, and XII, 78 CoM. L.J. 429
(1973).
235. II COMMSSION REPORT, supra note 10, at 252 (§ 7-310(d)(2)(B) Bankruptcy Act
of 1973).
236. Id. at 254 (§ 7-310, Note 9(c), Bankruptcy Act of 1973).
237. Id. at 241 (§ 7-303(3) Bankruptcy Act of 1973).
238. Id. at 242 (§ 7-303(4) Bankruptcy Act of 1973).
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ment over the present system.23
In summary, one cannot argue with the goals of the proposed
Act; but they are not likely to be attained unless certain sections
are substantially revamped. As one commentator has said:
Very few people disagree with the objectives expressed, but most
informed and interested parties become emotional about some
part of the proposed Act. The commission tried to assemble
regulations that would cover all situations in all communities
whether large or small, urban or rural - and all business from
the multinational conglomerates to the "mom & pop" grocery
store. It just wasn't in the cards. 4 '
There is no doubt that the present system of relief offered to
corporate debtors under the Bankruptcy Act is in need of comprehensive changes. The Act proposed by the Bankruptcy Commission, however salutary its provisions may be, should not be substituted for the present Act without detailed examination and
modification.
ELAINE H. BECKHAM
JAMES W. ORR
239. The proposal to allow future participation if warranted (§ 7-303(3)) is not expected to create a great amount of litigation. However it may create problems in formulating plans and determining valuation. Allowing the owners of the debtor (§ 7-303(4)) to
participate in the reorganized company is not likely to provoke much litigation, because
the participation is conditioned on the owner making a meaningful contribution to the
plan.

240. Seidman, The Bankruptcy Act of 1973-A Critique, 79 CoM. L.J. 297 (1974).
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